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Plaintiff-Respondent, William R. Kelley, Jr., by and 
through his counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, submits the following petition 
for rehearing. 
INTRQDVCTIQN 
This request for rehearing is not an attempt to reargue 
matters Kelley previously briefed and argued. The court decided 
this appeal on a ground that Kelley never had an opportunity to 
address. It was not raised in the trial court. It was not raised 
in the docketing statement or in the appellant's briefs. Because 
Kelley never had an opportunity to address the issue, the court 
failed to consider all the relevant facts and law. Consequently, 
the court reached a result that is unsupported by the law and 
the evidence. Because the court's decision, if allowed to stand, 
could deprive Kelley and his family of their home of the past 
twenty months even though the seller has accepted their money 
and deeded the property to them, the court should grant Kelley's 
petition for rehearing and decide this appeal on a proper ground. 
PACKgRpyyp 
Kelley brought this action seeking a declaratory judg-
ment as to the interpretation of an Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment (the "Agreement-) and the parties' respective obligations 
under the Agreement and seeking specific enforcement of the Agree-
- 1 -
ment. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss 
and granted Kelly summary judgment ordering the defendant, First 
Security Mortgage Company,1 to convey the subject property to 
Kelley. The court reserved the question of whether Kelley was 
entitled to an abatement of the purchase price or damages. The 
parties then settled the damage issue, and a final judgment was 
entered. First Security conveyed the property to Kelley, and 
Kelley and his family have occupied the property for over a year 
and a half. 
On appeal, the parties agreed that the issue was the 
timeliness and sufficiency of Kelley's tender of performance. 
See Brief of Appellant at 1; Brief of Respondent at 2. This 
court, however, stated the issues as (1) whether the Agreement 
provided remedies to Kelley if the defendant was unable to convey 
marketable title and (2) whether those remedies required the 
defendant to convey the property if title was not marketable. 
Slip op. at 1. The court concluded that Kelley's only remedies 
under the Agreement were to waive any title defect and proceed 
with the closing cr to terminate the Agreement and receive a 
refund of his earnest money deposit. J£. 
1
 Appellant, Leucadia Financial Corporation, was sub-
stituted as defendant for First Security after the final judgment 
was entered. 
- 2 -
The court based its decision on paragraph H of the 
Agreement (mistakenly referred to as paragraph 4).^ Paragraph 
H provided as follows: 
If title insurance is elected, Seller author-
izes the Listing Brokerage to order a pre-
liminary commitment for a standard form ALTA 
policy of title insurance to be issued by 
such title insurance company as Seller shall 
designate. Title policy to be issued shall 
contain no exceptions other than those pro-
vided for in said standard form, and the 
encumbrances or defects excepted under the 
final contract of sale. If title cannot be 
made so insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless 
Buyer elects to waive such defects or en-
cumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this 
Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
Id. 
The court concluded, first, that "[t]itle could not be 
made insurable without exceptions for defects," and, second, that 
"Kelley refused to waive the defects." Therefore, the court 
2
 The court also looked at paragraph G of the Agreement, 
which stated in pertinent part: 
• . . Seller shall be required, through escrow 
at closing, to cure the [title] defect(s) 
to which Buyer has objected. If said de-
fect (s) is not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, this Agreement shall 
be null and void at the option of the Buyer, 
and all monies received herewith shall be 
returned to the respective parties. 
Record at 15. Paragraph G, unlike paragraph H, does not expressly 
require the buyer to waive any title defect. It merely gives the 
buyer the option of terminating the Agreement. As the court 
correctly noted, "Kelley refused to accept this option." Slip 
op. at 3. 
• 3 -
held, Kelley's remedy under paragraph H "was limited to a refund 
of his earnest money deposit, not specific performance.- Slip 
op. at 3. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court 
and remanded the case "for entry of judgment consistent with 
this opinion."3 
GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 
Because this court decided Leucadia's appeal on a point 
never raised or argued by the parties, namely, Kelley's remedies 
under paragraph H of the Agreement, the court should grant 
Kelley's petition for rehearing to allow him an opportunity to 
argue the law and facts relevant to that point, if for no other 
reason (point I). 
The court should also grant Kelley a rehearing because 
its decision was based on wrong assumptions, namely, that para-
graph H even applied because the property could not be insured 
(point II), that Kelley was required to waive any title defects 
before bringing this action (point III) and that Kelley refused 
to waive any defects (point IV). Kelley's filing of thi6 lawsuit 
and paying his downpayment into court, far from being a refusal 
3
 It is unclear what the court meant by this last phrase 
since Leucadia did not appeal the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Where only part of a lower court's 
decision is appealed from, appellate review is ordinarily limited 
to that part and does not extend to parts not appealed from. 
Gonzales v. R.J. Novick Constr. Co.. 20 Cal. 3d 798, 575 P.2d 
1190, 1194, 144 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978). 
- 4 -
to waive any title defects, constituted an election of remedy 
and showed his intent to enforce the Agreement according to its 
terms (point V), If the terms of the Agreement in fact required 
Kelley to waive any defect, then by his election he must be deemed 
to have waived any defects. The proper remedy would then be to 
deny his claim for damages or an abatement in the purchase price 
—not to terminate the Agreement and return his earnest money.4 
But before Kelley gave up his right under the Agreement to receive 
clear title to the property, he was entitled to ask a court to 
determine whether First Security had complied with its obligation 
to clear title, whether title was in fact not curable and whether 
he was entitled to any abatement of the price for admitted van-
dalism to the property while the seller bore the risk of loss. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
KELLEY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED 
BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE 
ISSUE UPON WHICH THE APPEAL WAS DECIDED. 
Despite the parties' agreement that the only issues 
on appeal were the sufficiency and timeliness of Kelley's tender 
of performance, this court decided this case on the grounds that 
the Agreement precluded the relief the trial court granted Kelley, 
The question of the parties' contractual remedies was first raised 
4
 By not raising the issue in the trial court and by 
settling Kelley's damage claim, First Security has mooted that 
issue. 
5 
in the trial court after the partial summary judgment was entered, 
in the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Judg-
ment and in Support of Objection to Proposed Order. See Record 
at 354, 358-59 and 362-65. It was not identified as an issue 
on appeal in the docketing statement or in Leucadia's brief. 
It was first raised on appeal in Leucadia's reply brief, and 
the specific ground on which this court footed its decision— 
paragraph H of the Agreement—was never raised in the trial court 
or on appeal. 
Ordinarily, appellate courts will not even consider 
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1169 n.6 (Utah 1988); Romrell v. Zions 
First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). Although the 
court may, in its discretion, decide a case "upon any points 
that its proper disposition may require,- Romrell, 611 P.2d at 
395, the Utah Supreme Court has generally exercised its discretion 
to reverse a judgment on grounds not addressed by the parties 
only where the trial court failed to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a).5 £ge idL? Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 998-99 
(Utah 1987). See also Bardeen v. Commander Oil Co.. 48 Cal. 
5
 In Hiltslev v. Rvder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987), 
the only other case Kelley has found in which the court reversed 
a judgment sua sponte on grounds not argued by the parties, the 
trial court's judgment was in favor of a nonparty. 
6 -
App. 2d 355, 119 P.2d 967, 968 (1941), cited with approval in 
Romrell, 611 P.2d at 395, and Acton. 737 P.2d at 999 n.4. In 
such cases, the trial court's failure to make the required find-
ings precluded effective appellate review of the issues the par-
ties had raised on appeal. See Acton, 737 P.2d at 998-99. 
Wherer as here, an appellate court raises a new issue 
sua sponte, counsel should have a fair opportunity to brief the 
issue and present their positions on it to the appellate court 
before the issue is finally determined. Johnson v. State, 240 
Kan. 123, 727 P.2d 912, 916 (1986), overruled on other grounds, 
Denton v. Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc., 242 Kan. 430, 748 P.2d 
420 (1988). If the court issues its decision before it has had 
an opportunity to consider a party's relevant arguments, it is 
appropriate to grant that party's request for rehearing. See 
State v. Stewart. 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986) (rehearing granted 
where decision was issued before reply brief was filed)• More-
over, the effect of remanding this case for entry of judgment 
would be to treat the defendant's motion to dismiss, the denial 
of which was not appealed, as a motion for summary judgment that 
was granted before the opposing side had a chance to respond. 
"It is error to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for 
summary judgment, without giving the adverse party an opportunity 
to present pertinent material•" Strand v. Associated Students 
of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). There-
- 7 -
fore, this court should grant Kelley' s petition for i: el lear ing 
t o aiiow him to present facts and arguments relevant to the issue 
decided. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON PARAGRAPH H BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT TITLE WAS INSURABLE. 
This court concluded that Kelley's remedies were limited 
to those found i n paragrapm li IXM/. auMj I 11 1 •" In 1 \w property could 
be made insurable through escrow agreement at closing 
exceptions for defects. 
As Judge Bene :lusion 
depends property" The Agreement describes the 
oroperty situated at 320 West Snows Lane" 
Park City. It tfu1" " property" was simply whainvm pin^'iii 
located at that street address as shown in First Security's deed, 
* - ** >*< 
* -f defect, and paragraph H does not apply, aowevej 
"propertyw was the property that the parties believed was covered 
ssumes, see slip op. at 2 
there may have been a title defect because the neighboring land 
owners, the Armstrongs, also claimed an interest iII a portion 
of the prope and dissenting opinions show that 
the Agreement's description of the "property- was ambiguous. 
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are 
controlling. John Call Bnq'q, Inc. v ,  Manti city Corp., /*-» 
P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). What the parties intended by am-
biguous language is a question of fact, Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985), which would preclude entry of 
judgment at this stage of the proceedings, the relief ordered 
by this court. However, the defendant may be judicially estopped 
from claiming that there was no title defect.^ 
Even if the dispute over the boundary between the Arm-
strong and Kelley properties is considered a title defect, para-
graph H may not apply. The only defects or encumbrances that 
would prevent title from being "insurable" under paragraph H 
are those not provided for in a standard form ALTA title insurance 
policy or not accepted under the final contract of sale. The 
boundary dispute with the Armstrongs comes under the standard 
exceptions in the preliminary commitment for title insurance 
that was issued in this case. Those exceptions included the 
following: 
6
 Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party is 
not allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in separate judi-
cial proceedings. Gray v. Fitzhuoh. 576 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 1978). 
In the Armstrong action, First Security took the position that 
it was unable to convey to Kelley marketable title to the property 
because of the dispute with the Armstrongs. See Amended Com-
plaint, First Security Mortgage Co. v. Armstrong, Civil No. 9447; 
Record at 29-30 I 17. It is therefore judicially estopped from 
claiming that the title was marketable. 
• 9 
•'•3. Discrepancies, conflicts. In boundary 
lines, shortages in area, encroachments, 
and any facts which a correct survey and 
inspection of the premises would disclose 
and which are not shown by the public records. 
Deposition Don Griffin [hereinafter Griffin Depo. 
} c J "I d d i i 'i a i cj i J cj i i \, 11 a i p a i: a g i • a f 1i 11 i • |>j' •1 i e i m • • -
the standard exceptions were broad enough to cover the dispute 
with the Armstrongs, clearly did * •:• . 
M I i»y wri. i HI I y i 'Hqtj ;i r e d 
waive defects or encumbrances under paragraph H if title could 
be made insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, 
insurable. Don Griffin., the i eaJ estate agent involved In the 
transaction, testified that there was a t :i t: .le insurance company 
who would insure the property. Grit tin Depo at I 0 1 -U..J. 
Because title could have been insured, paragraph H 
Kelley * s remedies. 
III. 
KELLY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO WAIVE ANY TITLE DEFECT: 
THUS, HIS FAILURE TO DO SO DID NOT LIMIT HIS REMEDIES. 
This court concluded that Kelley's remedy was limited 
earnest money, not specific performance, be-
cause he "refused to waive" any defects Refusal to waive a 
title defect could only limit Kelleyfs remedies if he was required 
7
 The relevant portions of Mr. Griffin's deposition are 
attached hereto as exhibit A. 
to waive the defect. As shown above, Kelley was not required 
to waive any title defect under paragraph H because paragraph H 
did not apply. 
Even if paragraph H applied or if Kelley had an implied 
obligation to waive any title defects before closing, Kelley 
was not required to waive the title defects before bringing this 
action, and the fact is undisputed that he ultimately did waive 
any defects.8 
A waiver is an unequivocal relinquishment of a known 
right. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 
445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968); Barnes v. Woods, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Kelley had a right under the Agreement to clear 
title to the property. Record at 16 I 3. Paragraphs G and H 
of the Agreement only applied if any title defect could not be 
cured through an escrow agreement at closing. There is no evi-
dence that the alleged title defect in this case was in fact 
"not curable," let alone not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing.^ The only evidence was that First Security 
8 Kelley accepted a special warranty deed from First 
Security for that portion of the property to which First Security 
had clear title and a quitclaim deed for the rest. See also 
Affidavit of William R. Kelleyf Record at 279 I 13 ("I am willing 
to accept whatever title First Security has to offer"). 
9 First Security concedes that a defect in title could 
be cured through an escrow agreement at closing by, for example, 
"paying money to release liens or other encumbrances." Brief 
of Appellant at 13. The title defect in this case was the fact 
that First Security did not have clear title to all of the prop-
- 11 -
undertook to correct the problem and then changed its mind. After 
fill ng a lawsuit against the Armstrongs i n Jul y 19 87, counsel 
f c: >r I i r s I: • - i: 4 , 11 98 3 ' cieii iarn1 i mi 
that Kelley close by September r with the boundary and 
water problems still unresolved, or take back his earnest money 
i 
First Security is prepared to sell the 
property to you "'as is' without warranty" 
in accordance with the terms of the earnest 
money agreement ]i ° First Security is a lso 
erty it had contracted to sell. Under these circumstances, a 
seller can remedy the defect by a reduction in the purchase price 
equal to the value of the deficiency or defect. Reed v. Alvev, 
610 P.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Utah 1980); Castaono v. Church, 552 P.2d 
1282, 1284 (Utah 1976). See also Rosenthal v. Sandusky, 35 Colo. 
App. 220, 533 P.2d 523, 526 (1975) (buyer can agree to take less 
than full title for a reduced price). Thus, the parties could 
have cured any title defect by providing, through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, for a reduction in the purchase price or a return 
to Kelley of a portion of the purchase price. 
10 The evidence showed that the parties had different 
views a- to what the terms "'as is' without warranty" meant. 
Wayne L. Lantz, Assistant Vice-President for First Security, 
testified that "as is" meant that the buyer took whatever First 
Security had* Deposition of Wayne L. Lantz [hereinafter Lantz 
Depo.] at 18-21. However, both Mr. Kelley and Don Griffin, the 
seller's real estate agent who prepared the Agreement, testified 
that "as is" referred only to the condition of the property and 
not to title. Griffin Depo. at 93-94; deposition of William R. 
Kelley, Jr. [hereinafter Kelley Depo.] at 45-47. The relevant 
portions of Messrs. Lantz and Kelley's depositions are attached 
hereto as exhibits B and C respectively. 
Even if First Security's interpretation of "as is" 
was correct, however, First Security was not entitled to insist 
that Kelley close without any abatement in the purchase price, 
as it did. See Lantz Depo. at 85. There was admitted vandalism 
on the property, which First Security valued at $50,000.00. 
See Record at 49-51. Paragraph P of the Agreement placed the 
prepared to assign you its rights in the 
lawsuit against the Armstrongs. Absent any 
obligation to the contrary or reimbursement 
from you for its legal costs and fees, first 
Security is no longer desirous of pursuing 
the lawsuit with the Armstrongs. First 
Security has not pursued the legal action 
against the Armstrongs as a result of any 
legal obligation, but simply because of its 
interest in closing the deal with you. First 
Security has never viewed itself as having 
the obligation to clear title, nor does the 
earnest money agreement provide for that 
obligation. Accordingly, as indicated above, 
First Security will sell the property in 
accordance with the terms of the earnest 
money agreement, as extended by this letter 
to September 15th. Otherwise, . . . First 
Security will return the $10,000.00 earnest 
money deposited in escrow to you and pursue 
other alternatives. 
Record at 114-15 & 292-93 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to First Security's assertion, it did have 
an obligation to clear title, regardless of whether the Agreement 
expressly provided for such an obligation. First Security ex-
pressly agreed to furnish "good and marketable title to the prop-
erty.- Record at 16 f 3. A duty of good faith and fair dealing 
is implied in every contract. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985); Leigh Furniture fc Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah 1982). Where a real estate 
contract requires the seller to convey clear title, the seller 
risk of loss before closing on First Security, the seller. Record 
at 17. Thus, even under its own view of the Agreement First 
Security was not justified in insisting that Kelley close and 
take the property -as is- with no adjustment in the purchase 
price. 
- 13 
has an implied duty to ileai the 1 i I In if i I i. #111 In dun* by "' 
exercise of reasonable diligence. Lanoston v. Huffacker, 
Wa s h . Ap 1' 7 7 9 „ f 1 1 H i" '211 I 2 6 li, ] ? 7 I ( 1 9 \ I «1, | ; Ace Realty, Inc. 
v. Loonev, bJI P i'li 11?/, M H O (Ok I a I "I H | "] 
In Ace Realty * Ace, the seller under a ret;!] estate 
< • *««- jnt to terminate the rights of the purchaser (Tri-
A n g l e ) . The contract required Ace lo furnish 1111 al-stiac1 , , 
title and gave Ace until June 20' to meet any valid objections 
lo 1 he t 1 l; J, e « **. 4 - the abstract disclosed an un-
recorded contract giving a th :i 1: c:i party (Altman) an option to 
purchase the property Tri-Angle asked Ace to secure a quitclaim 
unable to persuade Altman to execute a quitclaim deed and at-
tempted * return Tri-Angle's earnest money Tri-Angle 
ipJ'iset c e»| l I* lif Pi'i r nest mi t-, , A 1 f 1 Je l| "» , »ef it L^. h 1 
declaratory relief, and Tri-Angle responded by seeking specific 
performance of the contract. Ace argued that the contract had 
terminated because- -Angle 
by June 20 The court rejected the argument: 
No effort was made after June 20 to 
secure a Quit Claim Deed from Altman, nor 
was the purchaser notified that he [Altman] 
made no claim against the property. Fair 
dealing required that Ace procure such 
1 1
 Don Griffin, the seller's agent, also suggested that 
an obligation to clear up the boundary and water problems was 
implied in the contract. See Griffin Depo. at 96-97. 
1 4 -
deed if able to do so. They did not do so, 
but rather based their action after June 
20, not on the ground of inability, but upon 
the contention that the purchaser had lost 
the right to enforce the contract. 
531 P.2d at 1380. The court affirmed a grant of specific per-
formance in favor of Tri-Angle, the purchaser. 
Similarly, First Security did not base its actions in 
this case on its inability to clear title. Rather, First Security 
claimed it had no obligation to clear title and simply was "no 
longer desirous of pursuing the lawsuit" it had started to clear 
title. Record at 115. 
Contrary to First Security's assertion, it did have a 
legal obligation to clear title if it could do so by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence. Kelley was only required to waive any 
title defect if the defect was in fact not curable through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. There was no evidence that 
First Security could not have cured any title defect. The only 
evidence was that First Security was -no longer desirous" of 
doing so and claimed it had no obligation to clear title. First 
Security's lack of interest in pursuing the Armstrong lawsuit 
at best constituted subjective impossibility, which does not 
excuse a seller from conveying clear title. Carcione v. Clark, 
96 Nev. 808, 618 P.2d 346, 348 (1980). Kelley was not required 
to accept First Security's unilateral declaration that it had 
no duty to clear title or its determination that it had fulfilled 
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whatever duty I t had ££., Yost Farm Co. v. Cremer, 152 Mont. 
200, 447 P.2d 688, 692 (1968) (buyer not required tc rely e n 
jijeieiy im NHI i KM !» i Hp.rcjB(jni ail i on nuirei niiiLi i i I J e lie i ect h | . 
Before waiving any defect, Kelley was entitled to have a court 
declare the parties' respective rights and obligations under 
the Agreement airi f! U«l lliit fl» I U in f . ! I •
 r ™' [\i\\ m In filinq 
this action, Kelley specifically asked the trial court to declare 
that the Agreement remained . ! force and effect, that First 
Securi ty w j • • •. * 
Agreement, that First Security was obligated r .-r.: title 
the property and that breach of the contract was that of 
First Security. See Record ul nh ' \\ III I ' ? =• • * 
court to enforce the Agreement. If enforce the Agreement 
accc >rd I c i I: s terms meant that Kelley had to waive any title 
defect, he was prepared to do so and must be deemed to have done 
so. But was for the court—not First Security-- to say whether 
lie in iiiuh . I"!! ill I" in in i i j " n 'I, i a , i ii i n q I \\v I S M I P iPi's I1! lefense 
and then settling Kelleyrs damage claim, 111, waif. FIIBI Security 
— n o t Kelley—who waived its remedy. 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT KELLEY 
REFUSED TO WAIVE ANY TITLE DEFECT. 
This court's conclusion that Kelley refused to waive 
any title defect was contrary to the undisputed evidence con-
cerning Kelley* 
• 1 6 
Intention to waive a right is ordinarily a question 
of fact. See, e.g., Yates v. American Republic Corp., 163 F.2d 
178, 180 (10th Cir. 1947); Chavez v. Gomez, 77 H.M. 341, 423 P.2d 
31, 33 (1967). The only evidence of Kelley's intent was that 
he intended to enforce the Agreement. He did not refuse to waive 
any defect; he refused to waive any rights he might have under 
the Agreement. A refusal to waive the latter does not imply a 
refusal to waive the former. 
Kelley consistently testified that he was willing to 
close at any time, even with the boundary problems, and that 
he communicated that willingness to Don Griffin and Vivian 
Cropper, the seller's agents. See Kelley Depo. at 71-86, 125-
28, 134-36. The closing date had been extended three times by 
agreement, for a minimum of thirty days each time, to allow First 
Security to clear up the problems with the boundaries and water 
rights. During this time Kelley was repeatedly told that First 
Security was working out the problem and would get it taken care 
of. See, e.g. , Kelley Depo. at 73, 88, 90; Griffin Depo. at 
63, 102. He was looking for another extension agreement when 
he received the letter from First Security's counsel giving him 
seven days to close,12 with the title issues still unresolved, 
1 2
 Although the letter giving Kelley until September 15 
to close was dated September 4, because it was sent over the 
Labor Day weekend, Kelley did not receive it until September 8. 
See Record at 288 I 2. 
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or to "walk away from the deal H Record «i 114- 1'„>, 292--'y.i fn 
response? to this letter Kelley sent First Security's attorney a 
jiiu'i ,i I grain e ta t i i'i",j „, s ."J 
normal 30-day extension ' • •> * - Kelley was sti 1J willing 
and able to close. See Kelley Depo. 125-28; Griffin Depo. 
» li III !i)} I"1 1 f idav i t i)l Wi I I! i I Ren 
had two concerns though: He ^ to waive any legal 
rights he might have under the Agreement, based solely on First 
See I.I !• i t) i yifjbupf ii 11" I eill awse M inn I li il If (i n1 in i n b l i q a l l inn minlU I 
the Agreemen4 to to clear ti tie or to adjust the purchase 
price way for admitted vandalism, see Lantz Depo. at 85 
needed ai i op pc r ti u i ii t]r I:, :: s e e ai id e u a ] iia t€ • t h e c:i DCU-
ments related to the tit le problem. 13 see Kelley Depo. 78, 125-
28. He filed this action to preserve his rights under the Agree-
ment. ~ those rights were contingent on waiving title defects, 
he was prepared to do so. But he wanted a court—not First 
Security—to saj whether he was required to do so. 
Presumably, this court based its conclusion that Kelley 
refused to waive any defects on two things: a letter from Kelley's 
counsel dated September 22, 1987, in which Kelley tendered to 
First Security the downpayment under the Agreement "conditioned 
only upon First Security honoring its obligations pursuant to the 
*3 First Security never provided the necessary title docu-
ments to Kelley before he filed this action, despite their premise 
to do so. See Record at 283. 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and delivering the property free 
from those defects which it has undertaken to cure#M Record at 
61# and on Kelley's filing of this lawsuit. Neither action was 
inconsistent with Kelley's election to close the transaction 
according to the terms of the Agreement, and thus neither action 
constitutes a refusal to waive any defects. 
The only condition stated in the letter was that First 
Security honor its obligations under the Agreement and deliver 
the property free from the defects it had undertaken to cure. 
Clearlyf a "condition" that one party to a contract honor its 
obligations under the contract merely shows an intent to enforce 
the contract. The parties obviously interpreted the terms of and 
their obligations under the Agreement differently. That is why 
Kelley had to file this action. But asking a court to construe 
the terms of an agreement and to enforce the agreement according 
to its terms is a far cry from refusing to waive any defect. 
Similarly/ for the reasons stated in part V, infra, 
the fact that Kelley brought an action to enforce the Agreement 
cannot be construed as a refusal to waive any title defects. 
Rather, it shows Kelley's intent to preserve his rights. If 
his right to enforce the Agreement was contingent on his waiving 
any defects , then one must infer that Kelley intended to waive 
those defects. 
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In short, evidence that Kelley insisted that First 
Security comply with the Agreement, that he brought an action 
to enforce compliance and that he accepted a special warranty 
deed from First Security that did not include the disputed portion 
of the property negates this court's conclusion that Kelley waived 
his right to specific performance by refusing to waive any defect. 
V. 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT KELLEY REFUSED TO WAIVE 
ANY DEFECT IS INCONSISTENT WITH KELLEY'S ELECTION 
OF HIS REMEDY. 
Not only is the court's conclusion that Kelley refused 
to waive any defect not supported by the record, it also is con-
trary to the controlling law.14 Kelley had the option under 
either paragraph G or paragraph H to enforce the Agreement or 
to declare the Agreement null and void and receive a return of 
his earnest money. These remedies were clearly inconsistent. 
Kelley could not affirm the contract and seek to enforce it while 
at the same time rescinding or terminating the contract and re-
covering his earnest money. "The former remedy counts upon the 
14
 It is also inconsistent with this court's conclusion 
that Kelley refused to accept the option of terminating the Agree-
ment under paragraph 6. See slip op. at 3; supra at 3 n.2. If 
Kelley had the option under either paragraph 6 or H to enforce 
the Agreement or to terminate it and he refused to terminate 
it, then he must have chosen to enforce the Agreement, which 
necessarily meant waiving any title defects if he was in fact 
required to waive them under paragraph H. 
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affirmance or validity of the transaction, the latter repudiates 
the transaction and counts upon its invalidity• The two remedies 
are inconsistent, and the choice of one rejects the other, because 
the sale cannot be valid and void at the [same] time.- Cook v. 
Covev-Ballard Motor Co.. 69 Utah 161, 169, 253 P. 196 (1927). 
Where, as here, a party has a choice between two or 
more inconsistent remedies, he has a duty to choose between them. 
And, •'where the duty to elect applies, then the bringing of an 
action based upon one of the remedies or rights constitutes an 
election which is irrevocable except in case of mistake of fact 
or some other good and sufficient legal excuse." Howard v. J.P. 
Paulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 495, 127 P. 284 (1912). 
By filing this action for specific performance, Kelley 
elected his remedy. He chose to treat the Agreement as valid 
and paid his downpayment into court.*5 jje could not thereafter 
terminate the contract. Cook. 69 Utah at 168; Salt Lake Citv 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 220-21, 17 P.2d 239, 242-43 
(1932) (an election of remedy is made when an action is commenced 
on one of two inconsistent remedies). Had Kelley later sought 
to terminate the Agreement and receive his earnest money back, 
under the authority of Cook and other Utah cases, First Security 
could have held Kelley to his election. If the consequence of 
1 5
 First Security eventually accepted the downpayment 
and deeded the property to Kelley. 
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Kelley's election was that he thereby waived any title defects, 
then the court could tailor its order of specific performance 
accordingly. But First Security never raised that defense, and 
its settlement of the issue that the trial court reserved for 
decision, namely, whether or not Kelley was entitled to damages 
for First Security's failure to convey clear title to the entire 
property, moots any defense First Security may have had based 
on paragraph H. 
CONCLUSION 
This court decided this appeal on an issue Kelley never 
had an opportunity to address. Due process and fundamental fair-
ness require that Kelley have an opportunity to be heard before 
he is deprived of his property. 
Moreover, the court's conclusion that Kelley was not 
entitled to specific performance under the Agreement was not 
supported by either the facts or the law. The court should there-
fore grant the petition for rehearing and affirm the trial court's 
judgment. At the very least, the court should remand this action 
for a trial on the merits and not for entry of judgment. 
- 22 -
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EXHIBITS 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 63 
outcome." And three, "request to bank restakes on 
the property", and that is we wanted property stakes 
so we knew where the property was. 
Q. Was the property ever staked? 
A. Yes, it was staked because I have seen 
some of the stakes. 
Q. Is it still staked to your knowledge? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you ever get a local attorney's 
opinion on the probable outcome? 
A- No, because at this point Wayne was still 
saying that, you know, they were going — the bank 
was going to work it out. These were just 
suggestions that if Kelley did go -- did want to 
sign something that he would take the property. If 
he did want to do that, then he would want an 
attorney representing him telling him the probable 
outcome of that because the bank represented -- was 
doing all of it up until the end or still doing it 
but we were trying to get it closed. 
Q. And then it says, "Bank awaites call from 
O'Keefe"• Is that statement pursuant to your 
conversation with Viv; is that what she indicated to 
you? 
A. I don't know. i think — it doesn't say 
CATHERINE S. WHATLEY 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 
conversation. Then I called Vic, I guess. Same day 
7-17, I said so I must have told Vic that things are 
changing from what we had thought for the last fcur 
months. 
Q. But your notes don't reflect that you 
said that to Vic? 
A. I did. 
Q . You did, but your notes don't reflect 
that? 
A. That's correct. And "Vic said to set up 
meet::*:; with Wayne Lantz for Monday." So I called 
Wayne to set up a meeting and discuss the bank's 
intent i on. 
And 5:00 p.m. Wayne -- no, I called Wayne 
same day. He said the suit was filed. "I relayed 
Craig Taylor's conversation. Wayne said that 'it 
came down1 let's close." I assume — I don't know. 
I assume bank people after you have things on the 
books so long you have to get rid of them. And he 
was told they could close and give whatever title 
they had and what others had before them. "I then 
read him number three of the Earnest Money regarding 
marketable title and 'property sold as is' without 
warranty, did not refer to title but referred to 
number six" which has to do with the shape of the 
CATHERINE S. WHATLEY 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 94 
property, you know, the condition of the property. 
"Wayne said that he told them that he was 
thinking about it", them being you and "there was no 
change now", And that means no change in the 
process. Right now there is no change and that the 
bank was going to continue. "I said Vic wanted a 
meeting to set direction and plan what to do. Wayne 
said we could meet in one week, week of 7-27 because 
he was off next week and nothing would change until 
after attorneys filed and got back responses in a 
couple of weeks or so." And at that point it is the 
same day and I called Kelley. 
Q. And you relayed all of that conversation 
information to Kelley? 
A. Sure. 
The information that I had conveyed to 
you' 
A. Yes, and Wayne's information. 
Q. Do you recall what Kelley's response was 
when you indicated to him that we wanted him to 
share the costs if we were to continue? 
A, Yeah, it's in the notes. "Kelley doesn't 
want adversarial relations with Armstrongs. Kelley 
says he had no attorney because the bank said wait 
and they would work it cut when cleared title. 
r&turPTWF s_ WKATLEY 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 95 
1 Kelley wants to go forward. Still selling --"means 
2 selling his own properties back there" -- to meet 
2 the contract conditions. Making reservations to 
4 come out August first plus or minus." 
5 Q. Let me ask you a couple of questions 
6 about this, then let's take a break. So what was 
7 your understanding of Kelley's response then 
3 concerning our request that he participate in the 
9 payment of the attorney's fees if we were to 
10 continue on with the Armstrongs litigation? 
11 A. Well, this is the first time that this 
12 change and there is several changes in attitude --
13 Q. I understand. 
14 A. -- came up. 
15 Q. What was Kelley's response? 
16 A. Well, he didn't want an adversarial 
17 relationship with the Armstrongs. Everybody thinks 
18 we are at the end of the tunnel all the time in this 
19 deal. And he thinks it is all over and he says, 
20 "Why do I want to go sue those people who are my 
21 neighbors?" He didnft want an adversarial 
22 relationship with people that were his neighbors. 
23 Q. So his answer was he wasn't willing to 
24 participate in sharing of the fees? 
25 A. No. His statements were he didn't want 
CATHERINE S. WHATLE7 
(Examination by Mr- Taylor) 96 
this adversarial relationship and he hadn't got an 
attorney up to now because the bank was resolving it 
hopefully. 
4 I Q. But after you spoke to me didn't you 
5 I understand that the bank was not interested in going 
6 I forward with it without some participation from him 
in attorney's fees? 
MR. SAMPSON: Objection. Leading. 
A. No. No, I wasn't clear because I had 
10 | heard that from Wayne. You had just been in this 
11 | since 6-1 and I had most of my relationships with 
12 | Wayne and he is the one that told me -- and he had 
13 | had another attorney before Kevin Glade that I had 
14 | some conversations with, but mostly the 
15 | communication came through Wayne because up to this 
16 | time that was the first time that the bank and 
17 | Kelley had a different view on something. Up until 
18 | then everybody was just resolving the issue and we 
19 | were going to sell the deal and it was done. 
20 I Q. But there was no written agreement on the 
21 | boundary and water problems, was there? 
22 | A- Except things implied in the contract 
23 | that you have title and you are going to sell it 
24 | with title and you are going to give the guy title 
*5 I insurance. That was all the deals I ever did is you 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor; 
have title insurance and the guy gets the property 
and he gets the water and he gets what he gets. 
This is seven and a half acres at the mouth of the 
canyon. This is one reason I wanted to survey all 
that stuff. It's not like a condominium. 
Q. So you recommended to Kelley that you did 
want the survey or that he should get a survey? 
A . Sure. 
Q. And he agreed with your recommendation? 
A. Sure, and the b^nk resisted that for two 
or three counteroffers verbal. I think it was for 
cost, though, like it cost $400 or something. 
Q. On page 13 it s^ys, "Craig - our position 
is to go and clear up but costs should be shared 
with Kelley.11 So did you relay that information to 
Kelley then? 
A. Sure. I relayed that and I also relayed 
the next conversation on the same day with Wayne 
which says nothing has changed, nothing will change 
for a couple of weeks until we get something back. 
I am thinking about it. I am real clear about that 
time in this transaction. I am real clear how your 
statement was a real change. 
Q. Did you also convey to Mr. Kelley Wayne 
Lantz's statement that they could close and give 
CATHERINE $. WKATLEY 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 101 
the first of August? 
A- If he came out I d '1 * • I mean every time 
he came out, I think except once, and he was out 
some, I would meet with him and we would go to 
dinner. 
Q. 7-27 it says that you called Wayne? 
A. Yeah, because he said the week of the 
27th we could get together maybe. And so on 7-27, 
called Wayne, asked for return call, didn't get 
any . 
7-29, call Wayne asked for a return call 
on the 30th, didn't get it. 
7-30, call Craig Taylor, no return call. 
7-30, Don call Kelley talk to Susan, his secretary. 
7-31, Kelley calls. I don't know if he 
called or I called. "Bank is maybe settling down. 
Why stir it up". I want to know if he wants an 
attorney. Nothing has happened. 1 had no return 
calls for those days so he said maybe he didn't need 
an attorney. Maybe you guys are just going to take 
care of it like you had been. 7-31, called Wayne is 
out for the day. 7-31, Craig Taylor is out for the 
day. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
A. "3-3, Wayne called me 20 days" and I drew 
f»M«upDTMr c MwaTT^v 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor; ^v* 
1 I an arrow down because 20 days from 7-28 amended 
2| filing for Armstrongs to respond. "No change in 
3 I bank's attitude of carrying through although closing 
4 was discussed to close were title insurance company 
5 who said they would insure/' 
6 Q. Was that Summit County Title? 
7 A. Probably, This was probably Wayne's 
8 statement to me that he had had that conversation 
9 with them and they said they would insure. 
10 Q. Did you relay that information to Kelley? 
11 A. I am writing every phonecall down and I 
12 don't see it right here. 
13 Q. So you never conveyed Wayne's request or 
14 discussion of a closing with the title company who 
15 would insure? 
16 A. I would go back in my notes and talk to 
17 him. I don't have it right here, so I don't know. 
18 Q. So you don't — 
19 A. But there is no change in the bank's 
20 attitude to carry through so I think things are 
21 fine. 
22 Q. So you didn't feel it necessary to convey 
23 the discussion you had with Wayne concerning a 
24 closing with a title insurance company who would 
25 insure, yes or no? 
CATHERINE S. WHATLEY 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 103 
1 A. It's not in my notes. I don't think I 
2 did because the main thing to me is it's back like 
3 it was they are going to carry through. See, my 
4 view of that whole period is that you guys are 
5 trying to carry through. You wanted to do it. He 
6 wanted to do it. The worms kept getting bigger. 
7 "8-10, Lantz called, time is up for 
8 answer by Armstrongs, nothing yet from Armstrongs." 
S Q. Then you have a line? 
10 A. This might have been a discussion with 
11 Vivian or Vic. Let me see what it says. 
12 Q. Where it says, "Close with guarantee, 
13 bank will continue --" 
14 A. " — with resolution of issues of clear 
15 title and give financing to buyer and his one 
16 successor to suggest marketable title." 
17 Q. You don't know. That was probably a 
18 discussion then with somebody in your office but you 
19 don't know? 
20 A, Yeah, see Vivian and Vic kept thinking 
21 well if the bank guarantees the title then we can 
22 just close the deal and they will carry on. And I 
23 thought that would be good for the bank because they 
24 would get their money. 
25 Q. What did Mr. Kelley stay about that kind 
(Examination by Mr. Taylor) 120 
1 A. He too. 
2 J Q. So what was Kelleyfs response to your 
3 indicating that First Security would pursue the 
4 lawsuit if Kelley paid the fees; was he agreeable to 
5 that or net? 
6 A. I don't think it was — you know, there 
7 is nothing in writing hard down that this is the way 
8 it is going to be, but it was getting down to the 
9 nub that changes were in effect now, not just 
10 contemplated. 
11 Q . You obviously knew because you had spoken 
12 with me . 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. And you knew that I represented First 
15 Securi ty? 
16 A. Right. Well, his position essentially 
17 was "I want to buy it", from my notes here, "I want 
18 to buy it. I really want it. I thought I had no 
19 problem. If you say I have a problem, they made a 
20 deal. We are ready willing and able", so that is 
21 his response. 
22 Q. Then it appears that -- does the 
23 conversation continue down here? Could you clear up 
24 what this is down at the bottom? 
25 A. That is probably later that evening. 
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s-nci t l*iS Fi^st Security Bank of Utah. N. A. vs F. S. rrircc.. .*r.. «: ?* . 
en-3 •xled as Civil No. C86-5910 cf record-,. to- ; .-«* our-j.c-e .W 
*ore*: iciure of the above referenced Trust Deed. 
• Lis Pendens in said action was recorded in the L>::C» cf tne Count/ 
Recover en Julv 31, 1986, as Entry No. 22^395 in Sue, 79*. at p:-.ce -:.. 
records cf Summit County. Utah. 
Psronvevir.ee of an Amended Trust Deed dated. October It. :** LZ. •i.-.c-.-vu-s i' 
r. S. r-rmce. Jr. and Anne A. Prince, husband ana WJL-,.. ». i.itccr. to 
firi>. Securitv Pank of Utahf N. A., as Trustee, ano ri.-s: S*cur:».v ban: 
of Utan. N. A. as Seneficiarv, to secure the payment cr : 7. 700. \vv. *.?£•• *j*:.d 
mteresr. recorded November Af 19B2. as Entrv No. ! •• r.~ :. ;n r^.of rj-2". 
.?.t pace £22-927. recoras of Summit Ccuntv« Utah. 
.Saic Ic-ec cf Trust and Ac.enced Ce-vd of Trujt ^v.irv', *«.cr.? ctr..-r 
neiio&tions. as set forth in said Deed of Trust ai*c Aiufinattd w-**w c 
I, ¥ 1 i" i.". '1 u.T" r„ £ l " 2 1 «i J. i 'Jc t y 1 1 1 t " i 
^
:
 L: C . - ' ina Prc.T<i5Scry No r .c 
?r, ice?: : - or,a 1 P'e ^ c i v i n c Comz^f • i m 
• p : : r v « v a n c 5 CT a ? \e -»menaed Tru • t:«-. xnc: 
renti. r.s:*: J^r.^sr-.' r<. 1933. executed t , . . S. Prir.ce- ' • «'.i- n.'-ue 
^nr, :£•• -• 'SG-an.a snc wit?, as TVustcrj. to First - e c u n t . ':*.-, i-f Liar. 
Ji r r 
r
. "s i An»?"i ; ? n f i t I s I n s u r a n c e Ccrr ioan, . a : Cc~" *"v z ics™ ar,d F i r s : 
( ? i : i ; r : : , e ? r ^ cf . * ,r i . N. A . , a s Ber.*}f ; c i »r"< , 1L- i r c u t ~. fc.i.cr.g c c h c 
t * e " e v t » c r t ; : io p e r f o r m a n c e c* i ' ; c ? t w e c n : : » a r c ocl i gazi om 
.-ace tc 5 3 A i «j.-- ,;»er*i *'»:r V..1" 
as £ni rv s:. J.-Zo.*. : r. _^w-! .o .-rt; - ji.-r £ • . recorded feoruarv, 3, ]? 
;: \z±* "^'••--: ir ^ 3 r- ;L. 'Jf 
"'::r,-2f 3 . w - i c n a r e a u e and J J 3 V S O ! 
NOT: 
" S T ' 
r.ama o-f W i l l i am h , i i » . • • <. . f i J , 
?-j.-n;vii t C C L . P I V , a n a n c ^ t c ^ ^ e n t a c r i c 
SCHEDULE B-2 
Exceptions 
qclicy or policies to be issued will contain except: cr.i .r tne ••-: i «.w: ,-,-:• 
*»s tn** sa.ne are uispossd of. to. the satisfaction .of the Co.T.ocr.y: 
fticrts or- claims of parties in possession not .shown by the pubU~ rez-rzz. 
lizzzxient*. or claims ct ^ easements, not shown*by the public "<acorcis. 
Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shcrta;ss in area. 
encroacrunents, and any facts which a correct survey anc inapectiori o- t*:*. 
prer..-*es would dicclcse anG which are not shown by the public records. 
r*n-. hen, or right to a lien? "for services, labor or .;.-.,! ena] heretofore? 
c«" ^zrea+zer furnished. imposed by law and net •^'.oun «y tne pud;,. 
rf^CTti. lidns. encumbrances,, adverse clai.r.£ or ctr.*«" ;.-*ttfe~s. it a«. . 
c •'"?.•• t5-J. fi^st appearing in the public rszcrca or atioininc ijesscuer,: * .-
tn~- ^tt^ctive cai^ hereof out prior to the. date the ;r:^.jsc: :rsL?,r.-j 
.•.quires of reccrc f:r value the estate or interest o. wcrtcace t."se-*.-.i: 
••w»'j;'"g': - • / *.ii5 Ccuimi trnent«; . • 
7a.:-4 fcr t.'rr ^e«r 1987, now accruing but not yet c.r or pew.-iic-. in, 
:•:•. .i: r&r subsequent years. Currently assessed undsr -*~r\:\
 :\ic. *•--!!:•_ 
fc- Pares! 1. and FP-25-E.for.Parcel 2. 
.<AFF2CTS PARCEL X> 
fi sc:2 to Summit County for the taxes for the year lv^«. ir. the cr:r:r. :%: 
a.r.cur.t of t4.8Il.26, plus interest, penalty and rostc. Scrssi V.TJ. 
PP-25-D. 
:•. Suo •:?«Ow,.ent del inouencies were added to said sale as »rj;cus: Year ist-.... 
**,£•?£. 03, plus interest, penalty and costs. 
:. <EFFECTS PARCEL 2) 
A sale to Summit County for the taxes for the year I'fc.:. i:. ch* cn.unc* 
amount of S291.5E. plus interest, penalty and costs. Serir.l fto. PP-23-E. 
d-Subcecuent delinquencies were added to said sale as *£ilz«z: Year ivt^. 
^305.9*1. plus interest, penalty and costs. 
. Thi«3 oropertv is within/the Snyderville Basin Sewer improvement Distriw':. 
and the Park City Fire Service District, ano is su&.^rt to trie crtsrc:— 
s,nd assessments thereof. 
. The affect of the Park City-Snydervill* Recreation District, a^corde-:. 
October 14, 1986, as Entry No. 259244, in Sock 402, at Face 6*4, recoro* 
cf Summit County, Utah. < . , . _ , . 
<AFF£CTS THAT PORTION OF PARCEL NO. 1 LYING SOUTH Cf THE CENTER LINE OF 
SECTION 8. TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, -RANGE. 4 EAST, AND ALL CF PMACEL 2*> -« 
right-of-way for ditches or canals constructed by tr* autr.oritv of ri-.._ 
United States.- As reserved by the United States jf America i«-» t^ .«i 
certain patent sated May 25, 1900, and racsrdsd Qctct,*r IV. i?o;. m fee 
1 of Patents, at Page 330, records of Summit County, Utah. 
„ (^FFE""* rAFCEL NC. 1) "h* right, privilege and author it .< :,o cc.-itrjc: . 
rs-T^'C^.r'ucti operate *nr; maintain its lines of te: r:.-f'iw,,T »T.Q fvi^^r^w: . 
arc r:. ;.rts incident tnereto, over and across the toil' : ••: • K:I: : ,;. .
 : t. . 
e:ch* T?et 't?1" in width described by a center line with tot;r tee: \ -i , i 
* 1t n e r ^  31 d e. as -follows: COMfiE NC ING Sou t h 2. 6 - *-'. 7 ^  ^'eet ;rd * t-:- -
r.A5^»S0 teet from tha Northeast corner of Section 2. Tcwn^! :»i ,: ,: Scut"*., 
Rrng? 4 Ear*. j*lt L af ;;e Base and Her idian: tt ie; ic3 5CJ; :,t:i 0* • " F."*A 4 
f «t?t tc =?f II J 
a .This is r-s granted to the Mountain States 7s;epnune and Telegrs," 
Cc^c-r.-/, bv • %icht-of-Way Easement, oated July 2;. ?.c'7i, and recfrrjid 
S^or-s^ar If 1971, as Entry No. 113900. in Book S1-33. 3 t r'sjs l.f r»c-ir^-
c - 2...' • ^ T. 11 C o u n t > *• LI c ah.% 
- ^ i i ,- ; • r t -o-r- wa
 y i 'oi i n g r e s s r id e g ' eta!*., j r a n t e o I D J i r ; ; . . 
? . ; / e V\ R i r - . ' ; K c ! : , h u s b a n d arn'l w i f e , by * III I I I I ? i n * L C J a . u " .' i > 
i C ;- a' >c r s:oraed February 13, 19Bl. as cr,;;1^ *,J i o./i. 
•^ -•"••
:
. ;-.t I :=!' :?e 761. Said Quit Claim Deed bo3 corr«-::.. 1 anc1 .-e-*-eu-r a-. 
rsr:; 21 ! bl • as entry No. 177560. ii" ':.-MI M-li-1. , J«. . . '«L« 
• ":, ^ U . M 7 J : I C o u n t y . U t a h . The r i g h t - o f - w d , g r a n t e d h e r o <r i .* £ ~ . : * V . i i . o t e , 
2 i •; : -I: w i d e . r h e c e n t e r ! i r e o f wh i ch i * | I M I I I I HI 1 / -*ii - i ,ed *i mr\\\ . . . 
• r-E-r I ;*••:.' wi~ a t ci c c i r t Sout! - ! .1 : J ° C . 30 f e e t c.na West I t i M . . - - « ' . - r c r ;,- . 
i ' i c r t n . v e s i c o r n e r c* A c t i o n 3* 7 o w n s h ; c 7. ; o t ; i l i . F-.ariCi ^ £ .• . . t / . : ' .• 
? r « 3 *-*r< r i e r i f l i a n , i.l c a n n i n g E a s t t o t n e c e n t * , ^ J t .r C : . - c* " u - u 
*.-r r,.- . ji^ = £ r o w ' s L a n e 
- „ *ha_ . c o n t a i n , in a d c i ^ i o n t o t h e i t e m s hp" 4 •• » S i n i r i u l e f- ,.' , 
ki I c*i ng I t e m s : 
The u e e o o f T r u s t . i f a n y . r e q u i r e d y n d e i . c h e d u i e - _**. n u i * f . . u i . . i . 
.. u n p a t e n t e d m i n i n c c l a i m s ; r e s e r v a t i o n s o r e x c e o t i o . s :r p ^ t e r . c i ': -. 
A c t s ai ; t h c r i z i ng 11 i© I sst iar ic:e t h e r e c - f I wa , te r r i g h t s . I
 L:.. r• •' f„.i• : * 11« *:: •:: 
water. 
,J Anv ar.i all unpaid taues, asaassments and unredeer.iad ta#. ^i«^. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
;RCEL *n. i 
Dvim- i~g at a ooint South 2630.74 feet and West 2776,30 T'eet frc.n tne Mortn-
ist ccrri^r ot Se-ct-cn 3. Township 2 South, Range 4 East. Salt Lake Base ai*o 
er:i'C'i. anc ru^iins thence South 4 degrees 03" East 421.40 tse:s thence 
ruth 56 ot?grees 22' West 261*30 fset: .thence South SO decrees 52' West 2''S.0 
*?et: ^honce Sautn 47 decrees' 34' West £00.0 feet: thence.- North 26 cssrisi 7 
erst 53£.v -*et to the center line of a ditch; thence Worth 53 decrees 10* 
is; T.-.": *^st along -said ditch to ah old spring: thence r.ortn -*0 dv::*6ri u.-^  
8:*0 feet: ':hf»nce North 71 Degrees East 37.0 -rest: then*, v ^cr Cn 6 a cejrsea 
2" Eai;t 147.£i teet: the«-,c~ North 30 degrees 35* East -12. II- ?*<•-• t; tnenca ^^^. 
::.-? ^2'-.: thence <Jcrth 43 tieur&es. East 86.0 -feet; tn.*n:e -:io-th ;:.7 ^ 6 ^ ^ ^ : 
E% East 125.0 -feet: thence North 5=? degrees £0 East 20/. •. re=ra tntrnui- ic.--' 
~* ae.j.-*-3fS v*-' East 23.0 -feet: thence North 37 degrees 5:' East "••. -?'*»t: 
hence ^orth 34 cegrees 15* East 75.0 fe&ti thence East *r... 6C feu-:: t^^nce 
outn 37.0 tee": thence 5o«.»th 85 Degrees 25' East *'7. : ?,-.?; :u v.£ pt*nt o-
•eg inn inc. 
:^: 2£L S'sJ. 2: 
>Minnuv; at a point South 2630.74 feet and West 2776. -£o fwst -r-.-. the .\c:rr..-. 
-:.i-t corner of Section S, Town snip 2 South, F.arce 4 Ea»-:. •-,. ! t LAJ s ^ 3 : c* . 
^er-du.n, and running thence South 4 oegrees 03* E*zz ^2i«40 •JS-:? tn^nce 
r^-rtn c ;• cegrees 40" Eas»t 112.67 feet: thence North o .;;eo:'?.-v* zZ' Ear.: D.-.H. -
**c-t; thence Soath S*? oegrees 30' West 126.00 feet to tr.± poirt o? t**g: r«->:..-
r05ETHZi\ WITH a right-of-way for ingress to and egres.^ f.-c-*- ?»r:«l H O . 1 *...; 
Parcel r-o. 2 over a roaowayf which is aoproximateiy tnrcs rc-Cr i<:c*e. *J>e 
r.entcrline of whicn is more particularly described as tollo^ssx 
IC5 !<-'?< I KG fi.7 a ooint South 2607.61 feet and West 2253.77 **et *rc« the Nor... 
*«st corner ot Section B9 Township 2 South* Range 4 East. ^«lt Lake ^ase ••*•.; 
*i«rioion. ana running thence South B? decrees 56* Eaat. IioV7. >6 rtf«: roar a c. 
;*25. tr the center of -the state highway. 
LECiS A*;3 EXCEPTING from Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2. t.s fc!lowing; 
•SP2M:'ii-45 H T a point South 2615.05 feet and Iriest 272*. 20 r*et froc. Lha nurc:. 
*-*st zorr.tr of Section 8. Township 2 South, Range 4 cast, ialt La*-* ^«»e ..<•.-•:-. 
Meridian, saic point also being en a fence line and runm.vj thence South ; 
fierce 2~*i4M West along maid fence line 2S1.84 feeta thence N u t n fc'ti ce-:*-.>-
.?!•#' Wes: 132.8? + eet: tnence North 0 degrees 26* West 150.00 -ceti m*.iC* 
V.Twitn Sfc? decrees 25* East e4.5?5 feet; thence North £ c dtcr -.** >'* fca-at tl. -
est to tne coint of beginning. 
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SEELY, STACY, JONES & ASSOCIATES 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS 
800 Boston Buiidmg 
Ssi! la*e Cny I IT 8.:in 
328-1 IBS 
2661 Washington, #202 
Ogden. Utah 84401 
621-7477 
:VM'!2?T «W 
1 J Q. What was your counter? 
2 J A. We countered at the purchase price of $750,000 cash 
3 I at closing, property sold "as isn "without warranty," title 
4 J conveyed by special warranty deed, corporate form, other 
5 I terms to remain the same. No survey to be provided by 
6 J seller — and somebody else has — something else written 
7 J under it but I can't — 
8 J Q. What did you mean when you said the language is to 
9 I be "as is"; the property is to be sold "as is"? 
10 I A. What's there is what you get. 
11 Q. Who chose the — thank you, Debbie — (Pause) 
12 J (There was a discussion held off the record.) 
13 Q. BY MR. OLSEN: Who chose the words "as is"? 
14 J A. It's just a standard close that we use on all of 
15 J our real estate transactions. 
16 Q. First Security Mortgage uses in all of yours, your 
17 J transactions? 
IB J A. On real estate property. 
19 I Q. When you aay "standard," explain that to me. 
20 J A. Standard. We just put it on all of our documents. 
21 I Q. How do you know to put it on your documents? Are 
22 I there instructions telling you to do that? 
23 J A. Itfs just been a practice since I started. 
24 I Q. Are there any written instructions telling you to 
25 do that? 
SEELY, STACY, JONES & ASSOCIATES 
1 * 
A. uL. 
^ . Su (in d I 1 1,1111111 dc icu rm en ! s you j u s t p u t "^-i r " 
.. A. I c a n ' t - 111 • a • i cr Inn'*,. Fox r r y r e l l , I d u . 
. (J. An,*) ," „ j j j s e l l i"* "a% 15 *" ' i | ' " 'if i s " I n a 
d o c u m e n t , w ^ l ^n you i i i M II i i m i i 
lm T h a i y o u ' i t . t i iNiinj HH1 p r o p e r t y i u s t an i i i s 
Q. Which mean* *~ ' 
8 I A. Which means 
MR TfcVLOR: O b j e c t i o^ He " • F> I ir r irini ,, rii 11i n H I I» i i n, i i 
J h , O L S E N ; " " , , - , T •-*+ K ; s u n d e r s * 
eu tr ia I . 
Whe - - - x * ^ u ^ ^ K « T ^ ^ p ^ r t y *s , 
I f a k e ? 
15 I A. dki. wfidt e v e r Fir. i :1 S e c u r i t y M o r t g a g e h ^ c 
iy I J L U^wn *nif! s u b p a r t s , Let ' s rfSSiiii" -. * - . . - _ v . ^ , , ^ ^ ^ 
lfl I t h p p r o p e r t y . I In > In I I I « II I 
14 MR. TMi ini'1 g o i n g t o i b j e d T ^ a t ' ^ » - h e ' s 
20 I a s k i n g a h y p o l IHF I i m i i HI \\ t h e w i t n e s s Lu 
21 s p e c u l a t e , 
2 2 MP "ii > , , i j i in i i, » t e d . 
5 1 iji " i I I I I L l u t i i c o h T P C f i o n s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a 
2 4 in mi in i hr- p r o p e r t y , lu'm. i i i |, ' e 
in i whdI y u u l d II 1.1.^  J i t i e s b e t w e e n F u s t S e c u r i t y 
• 
and the buyer, as you understand it, when you use the clause 
tfas is*? 
MR. TAYLOR: Same objection? 
MR. OLSEN: To move it along, I'll stipulate to 
these questions you can have a continuing objection on the 
speculation. 
MR. TAYLOR: All right. 
A. That when we close the property, whatever's there 
is there. It's the buyer's. 
Q. BY MR. OLSFN: So, for example, if after you close 
the roof went bad, what would you expect your on-going 
relationship with the buyer to be at that point? 
A. None. 
Q. And what if a pipe broke after you closed? 
A. None. 
Q. Now let's break it down to the property description 
itself. As we discussed earlier, you were told that there 
were — I guess there was a home on the property of 
approximately 12 acres that First Security had obtained from 
Rick and Anne Prance, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. With regard to the property itself, the amount of 
the real property, did you think that "as is" had any 
bearing on that? 
A. Which property? The property, the land — 
~r*r*Tv- cTirY. JONES & ASSOCIATES 
Q. The l a n d , t h e amouivt of: tt*e l a n d . 
A, Yes 
Q • M l II I i, i H I 1 1 1 1 f • ' i p 1 11 in II 11 in III in I II" I "in i H I r 
b i 1 i t y t o convey? 
A . W i l d !" I: HI1 I ' I I I I" I I I ! I (I, ri I IJ "I I!1  II 1 1 1 " ! "I I I I ] . 
Q , N o w , 1 e t I M P m a k e a mi in |. Il f" ri 1 1 1 I J e n o r e e x 1 i e m e 
mi I ' in mi in I it i-ii e i I i i i i I  1 11 in in II II iiu I  mi ii I i \ i i u r p o s e s 
What I f you had so 1 11 II iII a d e s c r i p t i o n f o i I 2 
acre* ami I h e r e w e r e at t na I I \ i I y M s r r e « i t h e r ^ 7 Would 
Lht u s e o£ t h e y o i d "ai) ii>'" h a v e any inipeiuL i n t h a i 
s I t u a t i o n ? 
M R # TAYLOR: Same o b j e c t i o n . I t c o n t i n u e s . 
d o ni * t t h I n k t lie w i t n e s s i s o b l i g a t e d t o a n s w e r t h P s f 
il ] < p • ::) t h e t i c a ] q u e s t i o n s . 
I b e l i e v e t h e y a r e era] I a ng f o i a ] e g a 1 c o n c l \ ,:is i oi m 
1
 i |, i * p < «111 • • • « • " ' ' , „ ' ' ' e 
w i 1 in * I n s s p e r u j a t e a> t i i f a r t s t h a i have* I h i H a r v nn»1 
III 11111 III III i l l i l l IIII I II I I I III I I i l l „ i l l III i l l III Ill III! |( l I I) 111 I (I III III II II 111 Pi III III 11 Ill ( l l II 111 111 I 
a n s w e r . 
IIII I I I i!1 CI I .J Ii E I ill I ' 1 1 , I! !!• • 1 1 1 1 gi III i II I" Ill iiii Il: Ill, II "II • ( I Iiii • 1 S I a 1 ifl iiii 1 |:j I f 
I in nr 1 1 y i n g t o u n A e r s t a n d w h a t t h a t S s . 
Il ii ill! I ' I 1 1 0 1 ii!!: • IIII ill' i f ] i : " in t" iu i s iiu • :: i ' • 'ill! iipep :: 'ii f i e 
fj,"i11 i t i r,.ns a b o u t wha I """as i s ,1" i s
 # a s k I h e m , 
illllhi II11 I "Il I r 1 in Hill] quest , i inns . 






















































We were also g 
be signed, key 
f we were going 
to convey him the legal description 
the deed in lieu of foreclosure when 
k. 
And your understanding was that that 
man's land, correct? 
yes . 
oing to give him a trust deed and 
to the property, and — I don't 
to give him our assignment of the 
t or not. I don't recall that. 
What were you 
Nothing. 













to the 1 
It 
it 
would be up 
to be of va 
Okay. I'm ask 




. TAYLOR: I 
of the pond 
going to do about the pond? 
to reduce the purchase price for the 
nt did that pond, the loss of that 
of the property? 
to the purchaser whether they would 
lue to them or not. 
ing for your judgment. In your 
of that pond affect the value of the 
•m going to object to the reference 
I believe the testimonyfs been 
• •*#% #» % r r » / \ r t fcTlTC 
128 
I I y . Wiii. Lhei e any i es t r i r t ionr p l a c e d upon t h n 
1 j q r a n t i n g of an e x t e n s i o n ' 
h* JU*»I I U I U UUJ c ouns e l In i I li* W.UJI'J r lo r f bj* 
t h e flth and j u s t •— i t won I I I i11 " < I Mine • 
bt chance i n s l l o l.*ke the p i o p e r t j m*n i s / " Willi <, 
Il in u in recourse a g a i n s t us in any way, 
I I III I II i l l III! | I I 1 I I " | ' 
I' B i)1liiii!j because o f •*<=> «n" 
• ' ' i be d i s m i s s e d . 
Ill I i I id you evei o f f e r ami e x t e n s i o n t o the • 29tl \ :: i 30 1 h 
1 III i 1 i I I I I II ( in 
1 3 I  mi i i f i i i w t i e s e T V e d o n I tie 72nd, wr d i d n ' t 
15 J e x t e n s i o n •  -
16 
li j A. which wae- nol i urn-i n ' t nade t h e n 
18 I ^ f>l d y o u a i. I h ' i I ; . r r j • •• 
19 1 w 1 >ethei i t would lit1, poss ib le" In ye I d c i o s i n g and * in t• I easr• ; 
20 I do ymi rffr i i I ? 
I | %9 W e 0f£ e r c c3 d r i extension 
Q. Rut i1, w»f n«* in writ 1117 
j ^ jj0^ i t j»as t.hroug11 ii j cn»npe 1 
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1 the house, the carpet in the house and all the 
2 different things in the house, and that was my 
3 understanding of what "as is" means, and I totally 
4 disagree with your position of "as is." 
5 Q I understand that. I'm just asking you 
6 what your understanding is. 
7 A Ifm saying my understanding is "as is" is 
8 personal property. 
9 Q And you asked for Mr. Griffin's opinion 
10 as to what "as is" meant? 
11 A We discussed "as is." 
12 Q We meaning you and Mr. Griffin? 
13 A Don and I. And we both agreed it was 
14 personal property. 
15 Q When did you have that discussion with 
16 Mr. Griffin? 
17 A I don ' t recall . 
18 Q Do you recall where the discussion took 
19 place? 
20 A I don't recall. 
21 Q Was anybody else present? 
22 A Not that I know of. 
23 Q After the "as is" clause that I've just 
24 referred to, it says "without warranty." What was 
25 your understanding of the language "without 
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1 impact me, you know, how long would it take. I was 
2 more concerned about time. You know, I thought that 
3 it was going to be solved. I figured whatever it 
4 took was going to take care of it and I was more 
5 concerned about time frames, trying to plan my life, 
6 trying to get my children where they were going to 
7 be going as to school or not going to school or 
8 whatf s going on . 
9 I was trying to play my own personal life 
10 so it was more of a time reference to me. I really 
11 wasn't, again, concerned about the end of this 
12 thing. I thought it was just going to get cleared 
13 up and it was just a question of when. 
14 Q Were you willing then to close as long as 
15 these problems existed with the boundary and water 
16 rights? 
17 A I was willing to close at any time and I 
18 put up the money to show good faith. I was willing 
19 to close at any time. 
20 Q Do you recall any other conversations 
21 that took place about the property? 
22 J A No. Then I met with Lantz sometime 
23 during the summer and we walked the property. 
24 Q Do you recall when that was? 
25 A I don't know. It was with you, David. 
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1 discussions that took place with Griffin were -- I 
2 won't say 99. Excuse me. Eighty percent of my 
3 discussions were basically extensions, were getting 
4 an extension. Lantz was doing the extension, 
5 extension, extension. It was all extensions. All 
6 we were dealing with was extensions, and that was 
7 most of the conversation, and if I get the 
8 ex tens ion . 
9 Then I'd call them and say, "Where's the 
10 extension?" He'd say, "We sent it." You know, "It 
11 was mailed out." And I'd say, "Fine." Then we went 
12 on to the next month, the next 30 days or whatever. 
13 So most of the conversation was extensions, 
14 extensions, extensions, and, "We're working out the 
15 problem, we are getting the problem solved and we'll 
16 get it taken care of." I said, "Fine," and that was 
17 it. It was a very -- you know, the summer was a 
18 very quiet summer, really. 
19 Q Mr. Kelley, Mr. Griffin's notes state, 
20 "Kelley wants a letter of extension,," Do you 
21 disagree with that? This was under the date April 
22 13th, 1987. 
23 A Again, I don't know. The extensions were 
24 discussed. Don had mentioned the extensions and so 
25 had Vivian. And I said, "I want" -- "Yes. I want 
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that in writing." 
Q Why did you want it in writing? 
A I don't know, I guess I didn't trust the 
bank . 
Q You're an experienced real estate man. 
Are you familiar with the need for written 
agreements in real estate contracts, conveyances, 
transactions of that sort? 
A Well, I'm familiar with the fact that 
when you make an agreement you sign something that 
you agree to. They say it's proof of understanding, 
I guess . 
Q Is that why you wanted a written letter 
of extens ion? 
A Well, I wanted a written extension to 
keep everything going -- you know, staying the same. 
I didn't want it to lapse. But again, Don was 
basically -- you know, like I said, everybody was 
involved in the extensions because the bank didn't 
want it to lapse, either, and Vivian didn't want it 
to lapse, nor did Don. No one wanted it to lapse. 
Q Mr. Kelley, you've previously stated that 
you were willing to close with the boundary and 
water problems. 
A That's correct. 
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1 Q Why didn't you close? 
2 A I was never asked to close until late --
3 until you sent me that letter in September. No one 
4 asked me to close. They were solving the problems. 
5 No one said in July let's close. No one said in 
6 June let's close. No one said in August let's 
I / 
7 close. They just kept sending me extensions saying 
8 we're working on the problem, we're working on the 
9 problem, we're working on the problem. I was never 
10 asked to close. 
11 Q You didn't consider the letter that I 
12 sent you as a request to close? 
13 A That was the first time, when I got that 
14 letter from you, whenever it was. September, 
15 whatever. The first time — September 4th. That 
16 was the first time anyone asked me to close. 
17 MR. OLSEN: That's the date of the 
18 letter. 
19 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. That's the date 
20 the letter was written, and I received it on the 
21 8th. That was the first time anyone had said to me 
22 that they wanted me to close. Up until then they 
23 were working on the problem, going to get quiet 
24 title, clear it up. 
25 Q (By Mr. Taylor) Mr. Kelley, Mr. 
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1 Griffin's notes state, under date of 5-20, "Kelley 
2 called me, very distressed. Number one, how could 
3 he, Kelley, get a loan without clear title. Number 
4 two, how could he, Kelley, pledge property without 
5 clear title. Number three, how could he, Kelley, 
6 sell the property without clear title. Number four, 
7 what is it going to cost in time to clear title." Do 
8 you disagree with --
9 A I don't disagree with any of it. 
10 Q -- those questions? 
11 A No. 
12 Q You agree that you asked those questions? 
13 A Absolutely. 
14 Q But you were still very willing to close 
15 then with the — 
16 A Absolutely. But I needed information. I 
17 was asking for information. 
18 Q Regardless of the outcome of that 
19 information, you were willing to close? 
20 MR. OLSEN: Objection. Calls for 
21 speculation. 
22 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. I had no 
23 problem with the closing. The problem was -- never 
24 mind. I had no problem with the closing. 
25 0 (By Mr. Taylor) Did you ever convey that 




























information to Mr. Griffin? 
A I told him I wanted to close. I told him 
I wanted to buy the property. I always told him 
that. Never once did I say I didn't want to go 
forward. 
Q Did you ever convey that to Mr. Lantz? 
A I never talked to Mr. Lantz. I conveyed 
it to Don and Don conveyed it to Lantz. He was 
constantly talking with Mr. Lantz. 
MR. OLSEN: Craig, it's 12:00. Shall we 
start back here at ten after 1:00? 
MR. TAYLOR: That would be fine. 
THE WITNESS: Only time I talked to Lantz 
-- I told Lantz when I saw him at the --
Q 
A 
(By Mr. Taylor) At the property? 
Right. That I wanted to go forth. 
MR. TAYLOR: Let's go off the record 
then . 
(Recess.) 
Q Mr. Kelley, before we left you indicated 
that you were always willing to close the sale of 
this property with or without the boundary or water 
problems; is that correct? 
A What I'm saying, so we understand -- I 
understand what I'm saying. I'm not sure you 
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1 understand what you're hearing. What I'm saying, 
2 right along I was being told that the problems were 
3 being solved and that the bank was working to solve 
4 the problems. Don Griffin was telling me that 
5 things were going forward and so on. 
6 What I'm saying is as soon as someone 
7 told me that the problems were solved, then I was 
8 ready to go forward and buy the property. So at any 
9 time, if I had gotten a call in July or June or 
10 whenever and said, Bill, you know, we've solved our 
11 problems, we'd like to close next week, I would have 
12 said, Fine, let's go. But basically that's -- you 
13 know, that's my point. I was willing to close at 
14 any time when the problems were solved that the bank 
15 was dealing with and solving. 
16 Q But you weren't willing to close if the 
17 bank refused to resolve those problems? 
18 A I was willing to close but not giving up 
19 any of my rights that I might have in the court of 
20 law. You know, I was willing to let the judge 
21 determine what my rights were, but I was willing to 
22 close, yes, but I was not going to give up my legal 
23 I rights • 
24 I (Whereupon Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 3 was marked 
25 | for identification.) 




























Q Mr. Kelley, I'm going to give you what's 
been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 3 and ask you 
to identify that document. 
A I'd identify it as Exhibit No. 3 and it 
says it's a hand delivered letter from Craig Taylor 
-- no, wait a minute. To Craig Taylor. Yeah, okay. 










Do you recognize that letter? 
I've seen this letter. 
Did Mr. Olsen send you a copy of that 
Yes, he --
Is that how you saw the letter? 
Yes . 
You authorized --
Actually, I'm not sure about that. He 
might have read it to me over the phone and then I 
got it sometime later. 
Q And you authorized him to make the 
statements in that letter; is that correct? 
A He's my counsel. Yes. 
Q Does that letter accurately reflect your 
position? 
(Discussion between witness and his 
attorney.) 
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1 A So what David is saying is that we had 
2 filed a complaint at the same time as this letter. 
3 Q That's what Mr. Olsen told you? 
4 A Right. 
5 (Discussion off the record.) 
6 Q Would you mind reading into the record 
7 the portion that you just underlined? 
8 A "This tender is conditioned only upon 
9 First Security honoring its obligation pursuant to 
10 the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and delivering the 
11 property free from those defects which it has 
12 undertaken to cure." 
13 Q Does that statement accurately reflect 
14 your position at the time this letter was delivered? 
15 A I don't believe so, in the sense that I 
16 don't believe that -- again, I have not talked to 
17 David about this, but I don't believe there would be 
18 a condition. I wanted to purchase the property 
19 subject to them removing the defects and giving --
20 if they didn't remove themr to give roe time to find 
21 out what they were. 
22 I Q So this letter then does not reflect your 
23 position? 
24 I A Well, it does reflect my position except 
25 | that I have some reservations about this one 
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1 statement here. 
2 Q And what are those reservations? 
3 A That I believe that -- it says here, 
4 "This tender is conditioned only upon First Security 
5 honoring its obligations pursuant to the Earnest 
€ Money Sales Agreement and delivering the property 
7 free from those defects which it has undertaken to 
8 cure." It's conditioned only upon -- I'm not sure 
9 that I had any conditions with that regard. 
10 Basically I'm saying that I was willing 
11 to purchase the property. I thought First Security 
12 was going to clear up all the problems. If they 
13 didn't clear up the problems, I needed time to 
14 evaluate these problems and was still going to go 
15 forward, and then whatever remedies I had available 
16 to me legally I would have pursued. 
17 Q So it was your intent that a tender was 
18 to be unconditionally made to First Security? 
19 A No. The tender would have been that I 
20 I not lose any of my legal rights and so on. 
21 | Q Did you ever tell somebody to take the 
22 | closing money and give it to First Security? 
23 | A I said that the money was available to 
24 | First Security and that's when I tendered it, to 
25 | show good faith, and that I would , you know, give 
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1 the money to First Security when we passed papers on 
2 the house . 
3 Q This letter states that the money was 
4 placed in an account at Williamsburg Savings Bank; 
5 is that correct? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q That statement is accurate? 
8 A I believe so. I don't — you know, I 
9 finally -- at the time I didn't know that -- I mean, 
10 I was told or asked to send out monies to show good 
11 faith and that I wanted to go forward. 
12 Q Who asked you to send that money out? 
13 A David . 
14 Q Meaning Mr. Olsen? 
15 A Mr. Olsen. And that I wanted to show 
16 good faith. I told them that I wanted to buy the 
17 property and if the bank was concerned -- it was 
18 also my suggestion as well that I wanted to show 
19 good faith with the bank and let the bank know -- I 
20 mean, I could see where the bank might get a little 
21 concerned with having only $10,000 deposited on this 
22 kind of a piece of property so I wanted to send more 
23 money out to make them aware of the fact that I 
24 wanted to go forward and was ready and willing to go 
25 I forward . 
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1 Q And you considered that placing that 
2 money in Williamsburg Savings Bank was a sufficient 
3 tender? 
4 A Well, I don't know if it was tender, but 
5 it was sufficient for the bank to know my intentions 
6 and that I was showing the bank good will, that I 
7 had the money, wanted to go forward and here was the 
8 money available and I was willing to pass on the 
9 property. 
10 Q Gump & Ayers was the escrow in this deal; 
11 is that correct? 
12 A Yes, but I'm not sure that -- when was 
13 the 10,000 returned or something like that? 
14 MR. OLSEN: It wasn't. 
15 MR. TAYLOR: Just answer the question. 
16 THE WITNESS: Okay. Originally, yes. 
17 Q (By Mr. Taylor) Originally Gump & Ayers 
18 was the escrow? 
19 A Yes. For the $10,000, yes. 
20 J Q Why didn't you send the additional 
21 closing money to Gump & Ayers and have it placed in 
22 escrow? 
23 A Because I believe in my discussions with 
24 Mr. Olsen — 
25 MR* OLSEN: You don't need to discuss and 
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1 don't discuss what we talked about, 
2 MR. TAYLOR: You donft need to tell me 
3 what your discussions were with Mr. Olsen. 
4 THE WITNESS: I guess I just came to the 
5 conclusion that as long as it was in the State of 
6 Utah and in the bank in Utah and was available to be 
7 used for the down payment as we agreed that that 
8 would be fine and dandy. 
9 Q (By Mr. Taylor) Mr. Kelley, are there 
10 any other statements within this letter marked 
11 Exhibit 3 with which you disagree? 
12 A I didn't say that I disagreed. I said 
13 I'm not sure that I would state this as it is stated 
14 here, okay. I'm saying that as far as tendering on 
15 a condition, I was saying basically that I wanted to 
16 go forward. If the bank solved the problems, I 
17 wanted to go forward. 
18 If the bank came to me, as they did later 
19 on, and said, you know, if you don't go forward the 
20 deal is dead, then I said, well, hey, you know, I 
21 still want to buy the property. I need more time. 
22 I need some information to find out all the problems 
23 that you were trying to solve that hadn't been 
24 solved. I needed to find out what they were so I 
25 could have enough information. But anyway --




























Q Excuse me. Before you continue on, to 
whom did you state this position? I'd like to know 
everybody to whom you stated that position. 
MR. OLSEN: Other than counsel? 
MR. TAYLOR: Exactly. 
THE WITNESS: I've .been stating that 
position right along. 
Q (By Mr. Taylor) I understand that. 
A To Don Griffin. 
Q Do you recall --
A To Vivian. In fact, I saw Vivian at a 
dance or something and I stated it to her. That's 
pretty much it. 
Q Do you recall when you stated this 
position to Mr. Griffin? 
A No, but I had been stating that position 
on a regular basis to Mr. Griffin. 
Q Do you recall when you would have stated 
that position to Vivian? 
A It was -- I don't know. I really don't. 
No, I don't remember. 
MR. OLSEN: Did you also state it in the 
record in your complaint? 
MR. TAYLOR: Pardon? 
MR. OLSEN: If you want a complete list, 




























it's also stated in his complaint which was filed 
the 22nd. 
(By Mr. Taylor) Mr. Kelley --
Let roe just finish reading this. 
Okay. 






Q Mr. Kelley, I'd like you to refer again 
to Exhibit No. 2. There are a number of extensions 
to that agreement which are attached to Exhibit 2. 
Did you agree to each one of those extensions? 
A Yes. I've got my signature. Yes. 
Q Mr. Griffin's notes reflect that on 
several occasions you called and asked where your 
extensions were of the agreement. Do you disagree 
with that? 
A That I asked him where they were? 
0 Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: Do you want to read the 
witness's testimony so he knows that that's an 
accurate representation? 
MR. TAYLOR: Sure. I'll be happy to. 
Okay. I believe we've already referred to Mr. 
Griffin's notes wherein he stated "Kelley wants a 
letter of extension." 




2 Q Are you aware of who prepared the 
3 ex tens ions ? 
4 A I believe it was Lantz that prepared 
5 them, 
6 Q You're not sure of that? 
7 A And Vivian. Well, I think it was a 
8 coordination between Lantz and Vivian. 
9 Q Did you ever contact anyone and request 
10 that the deal close? 
11 A I certainly asked the question when was 
12 the deal going to close and that I wanted it to 
13 close, as I was trying to organize my family and my 
14 life, and they just kept telling me that it was 
15 being worked on. 
16 Q They meaning whom? 
17 A Don Griffin. And he referred to you on 
18 occas i on . 
19 (Discussion off the record.) 
20 I Q Mr.. Griffin's notes reflect that he had a 
21 | telephone conversation with tne on July 17th and he's 
22 I got in quotes, apparently referring to my statement, 
23 | wIf it gets hot and heavy, to have Kelley pay some 
24 J of the cost." And it also states above that that I 
25 I indicated to him that the bank is not obligated to 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
88 
1 "Craig was thinking about maybe you should pick up 
2 some of the costs.1' 
3 Q (By Mr. Taylor) Do you recall what your 
4 reply, if any, was to that statement? 
5 A I guess my reply -- I don't really recall 
6 my reply. No, I don't recall. 
7 Q Do you recall any other conversations 
8 during the course of the summer in which you 
9 discussed with Mr. Griffin what First Security 
10 Bank's position was with respect to the property? 
11 A We discussed on and off throughout the 
12 summer. It was basically that they were going to 
13 clean up the problems, that they were going to --
14 that they were suing the Armstrongs, that they were 
15 working on getting a quiet title, that they were so 
16 on and so on and so on, and then towards mid August, 
17 Don was getting very frustrated. He thought that 
18 you were dragging your feet, that things weren't 
19 moving all of a sudden, that things started to slow 
20 down. He didn't know why. 
21 He'd made several calls to Lantz, trying 
22 to reach Lantz. Lantz wasn't returning his phone 
23 calls. Couldn't understand why. Basically I think 
24 that -- well, I don't know why. You know, he just 
25 I thought things had slowed down and that they weren't 
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1 MR. TAYLOR: Let's have that marked as an 
2 exh ib i t. 
3 MR. OLSEN: These are his letters with 
4 notes. He's referring to your letter of September 
5 17th to me. 
6 THE WITNESS: Yeah. You gave me one of 
7 these. 
8 MR. OLSEN: He's made notes which were 
9 prepared for this deposition and I'm not going to 
10 put into the record. September 17, 1987 letter. 
11 THE WITNESS: Your letter. First 
12 Security will not consider the act of placing 
13 $140,000 in escrow as sufficient to close the deal. 
14 That's your letter. 
15 MR. OLSEN: But if you don't know, you 
16 don ' t know. 
17 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know. I'm just 
18 saying — I don't know when it was. I'm referring 
19 to that statement and it's dated September 22nd. It 
20 says Exhibit C here. 
21 (Discussion off the record.) 
22 Q (By Mr. Taylor) Just a couple of final 
23 questions. On September the 22nd of 1987, which was 
24 the deadline of First Security on which First 
25 Security requested that you either purchase the 
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1 property as is or take your earnest money back and 
2 walk from the dealf what was your position with 
3 respect to that? 
4 A Well, my position was that when I sent 
5 you the telegram saying that I didn't want to walk 
6 from the deal and my position was that I needed more 
7 time now, up until that point I was under the 
8 feelings or premise that First Security was taking 
9 care of any of the problems and dealing with the 
10 problems necessary to close this deal. 
11 And then when I received the letter, it 
12 was basically saying we are dropping away from this. 
13 We feel that we don't want to handle this anymore 
14 and we want to close with the problems still 
15 existing on the property, and so I said, well, I 
16 need to know what these problems are so I need time 
17 to look into these problems. 
18 I was concerned about the domestic water. 
19 I didn't know whether I was going to have water in 
20 the house. I was concerned about a lot of things 
21 and so I needed some time to check these things out, 
22 so I asked that I get the time to check these things 
23 I out. I was willing to go forward. I was willing to 
24 I close, but I needed information in order to 
25 I understand what was happening. Then things, for 
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1 some reason, started to get rough and it seemed like 
2 there was this big push to close this, and yet in 
3 one letter there it states that if I was willing to 
4 take the case against the Armstrongs, sue the 
5 Armstrongs, that First Security would basically 
6 extend my extensions without any limit. 
7 So basically I said I want to close the 
8 property, I want to know what's going on with the 
9 property, and basically I want to reserve my rights 
L0 to the changes that have taken place in this 
LI property. I had a pond that was empty, I had dead 
L2 fish. I didn't know if I had water going into the 
L3 house. I didn't know what land I was going to get, 
14 so I was -- I was willing to close and go forward 
15 but I was not willing to give up my rights as far as 
16 legal rights, that I was willing to let some judge 
17 decide, you know, what rights I had in this case, 
18 and that was the only thing that I was not willing 
19 to give up, was what I consider my legal rights. 
20 J I felt that First Security was bullying 
21 me and they were pushing me and for .five months they 
22 I were -- nothing was happening. Everything was easy 
23 going. Everything was fine. And then all of a 
24 sudden I get a letter. I kept getting extensions, 
25 I 30 days, 40 days, 50 days. Then all of a sudden I 
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1 get a letter that says you've got seven working days 
2 to close this deal. So all of a sudden someone 
3 decided to put the pressure on me, and I don't react 
4 very well to pressure. 
5 Q Do you have a copy of the letter that 
6 you've indicated gave you seven days to close? 
7 MR. OLSEN: It was Exhibit 2, wasn't it? 
8 It's the September 4th letter. 
9 THE WITNESS: September 4th letter. 
10 MR. TAYLOR: I don't believe we've marked 
11 that as aq exhibit. 
12 MR. OLSEN: It is exhibit — 
13 \ THE WITNESS: It says Exhibit A on mine. 
14 MR. OLSEN: It's Exhibit A to your 
15 affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss. 
16 MR. TAYLOR: I believe that's it. Is 
17 that it right there? 
18 THE WITNESS: Yeah, this is it. 
19 MR. OLSEN: Do you want to work from that 
20 copy? Let's just reference it as Exhibit A to the 
21 affidavit of Craig Taylor filed in support of the 
22 motion to dismiss in this lawsuit. 
23 THE WITNESS: I received this on 
24 September 8th, which was on Labor Day weekend, and I 
25 was told that I had to close on September 15th, so 
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Q After you received my September 4th, 1987 
letter, did you make an objection, a written 
obj ect ion? 
A I sent you a telegram. 
Q A written objection? 
A Yes, a written telegram stating to you 
that I wanted more time. I think you made some 
quote about that, if I chose, I could walk away, and 
I wrote a telegram saying that I was not going to 
walk away, that I wanted to buy the property. I 
don't know where it is. Anyway, I responded with a 
Ma ilgram to you. 
0 But in that telegram you didn't make a 
written objection to any of the boundary or water 
problems; is that correct? 
MR. oLSEN: The document speaks for 
itself. It says what it says. 
MR. TAYLOR: Well, we don't have that 
telegram. 
Q Do you have a different understanding 
with respect to- that telegram? 
MR. OLSEN: We're talking about the 
telegram that was attached to Mr. Kelley's affidavit 
in support of the motion for summary judgment. That 
was the only telegram sent. 
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1 THE WITNESS: That was a Mailgram. Your 
2 statement was -- it was not this letter. It was 
3 another letter. There's the letter. Received 
4 extension notice, seven day notice of extension. 
5 Received extension notice 9-8-87 for 9-15-87, seven 
6 day notice of extension. Property, 320 West Snow 
7 Lane, Park City. Will not walk away based on 
8 history. Need normal 30 day extension. Attorney 
9 David Olsen will contact you. 
10 Q (By Mr. Taylor) My question is did you 
11 ever make a written objection to the boundary or 
12 water problems? 
13 A No, I don't believe I did. I think that 
14 I -- I know I talked with Don and there was no 
15 reason to do that because I had not received 
16 information that would entice me to do that and the 
17 thing had been working and everyone was aware of the 
18 problems and they were just going forward with them. 
19 Q You received a title report; is that 
20 correct? 
21 A I don't know if I received a title 
22 I report. 
23 I Q But you just assumed that First Security 
24 | was resolving the problems? 
25 I A That's correct. 




























Q And that you have no other obligation? 
A Right. 
Q But to wait and let First Security 
resolve the problem? 
A Right, since they were the seller and I 
was the buyer. 
MR. TAYLOR: I have no further questions. 
(Whereupon the taking of the deposition 
was concluded at 3:05 p.ni.) 
* * * * 
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